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+# Allow Scripts
+
+## Summary
+
+Add `--allow-scripts` to control which packages may run lifecycle scripts.
+The value is a [dependency selector][dep-selectors] query — the same syntax
+used by `npm query`. Root and workspace packages are always allowed.
+`allow-scripts` is opt-in; when not specified all scripts are allowed.
+
+```ini
+# .npmrc
+allow-scripts = [name="esbuild"], [name="better-sqlite3"]
+```
+
+## Motivation
+
+Install lifecycle scripts execute arbitrary code before the consuming project
+ever `require`s or `import`s the package. Only ~0.6 % of packages on npm use
+them, yet they are the easiest vector for supply-chain attacks (`coa`/`rc`
+2021, "Shai Hulud" 2025–2026, countless typosquats).
+
+[RFC #488][rfc-488] proposed making scripts opt-in by default. That was
+rejected as too disruptive. This RFC takes a different approach: the default
+does not change. Users who want control opt in with `--allow-scripts`.
+
+This design also addresses wraithgar's request for a unified pattern that
+works across `--allow-git`, `--min-release-age`, and script control — all
+three can use dependency selectors to identify which packages a policy
+applies to.
+
+## Detailed Explanation
+
+### The `--allow-scripts` config
+
+A single `.npmrc` / CLI config value:
+
+```
+allow-scripts = all | none | <dependency-selector>
+```
+
+| Value | Meaning |
+|---|---|
+| `all` (default) | Current behavior. All lifecycle scripts run. |
+| `none` | No dependency scripts run. Root & workspace scripts still run. |
+| *selector* | Only dependencies matching the selector may run scripts. Root & workspace scripts always run. |
+
+The selector is any valid [dependency selector][dep-selectors] string — the
+same syntax accepted by `npm query`. Multiple selectors are separated with
+commas (CSS selector list syntax), not by repeating the flag.
+
+```ini
+# .npmrc
+allow-scripts = [name="esbuild"], [name="better-sqlite3"], [name="node-gyp-build"]
+```
+
+```sh
+# CLI
+npm install --allow-scripts='[name="esbuild"], [name="better-sqlite3"]'
+```
+
+### Root and workspace scripts always run
+
+Regardless of the `--allow-scripts` value, scripts defined in the root
+`package.json` and in workspace `package.json` files always run. These are
+the user's own scripts — there is no security benefit to blocking them, and
+`--ignore-scripts` already exists as an escape hatch for that use case
+(e.g. `npm test --ignore-scripts` to skip posttest linting).
+
+### Interaction with `--ignore-scripts`
+
+`--ignore-scripts` continues to work as today — it disables *all* scripts
+unconditionally, including root scripts. `--allow-scripts` only controls
+dependency scripts and does not affect root/workspace scripts.
+
+If both are set, `--ignore-scripts` wins.
+
+### Scope: all lifecycle scripts
+
+This applies to **all** lifecycle scripts run for dependencies, not just
+install scripts:
+
+- `preinstall`, `install`, `postinstall`
+- Implicit `node-gyp rebuild` (when `binding.gyp` is detected)
+- `prepare` scripts of git dependencies
+- Any other lifecycle script triggered by `npm install`, `npm ci`,
+  `npm rebuild`, `npm update`, or `npx`
+
+### Enforcement behavior
+
+When `--allow-scripts` is set to `none` or a selector:
+
+1. After the dependency tree is resolved, npm builds the allowed set using
+   `querySelectorAll`, plus root and workspace nodes.
+2. Before running any lifecycle script for a dependency, npm checks if the
+   node is in the allowed set. If not, the script is skipped and the package
+   is recorded as unapproved.
+3. After install completes, if any scripts were unapproved, npm prints the
+   full list and exits non-zero.
+
+A dependency that has no lifecycle scripts is never reported — only packages
+that actually attempted to run a script and were blocked.
+
+#### Error output
+
+npm collects all unapproved packages and prints them at the end:
+
+```
+npm error Unapproved lifecycle scripts were blocked.
+npm error The following packages have scripts that are not allowed to run:
+npm error
+npm error   core-js@3.42.0 (postinstall)
+npm error   @biomejs/biome@1.9.0 (postinstall)
+npm error   evil-pkg@github:attacker/evil#abc1234 (preinstall, postinstall)
+npm error
+npm error To allow these scripts, add them to allow-scripts in .npmrc:
+npm error   allow-scripts = [name="core-js"], [name="@biomejs/biome"]
+```
+
+Each line shows the package spec (name@version for registry deps, git URL
+for git deps, path for file/directory deps) followed by the lifecycle events
+that were blocked.
+
+### Examples
+
+#### Block all dependency scripts
+
+```ini
+allow-scripts = none
+```
+
+#### Allow specific packages by name
+
+```ini
+allow-scripts = [name="esbuild"], [name="better-sqlite3"], [name="node-gyp-build"]
+```
+
+#### Allow specific packages at specific versions
+
+```ini
+allow-scripts = [name="esbuild"]:semver(^0.25.0), [name="better-sqlite3"]:semver(11.9.1)
+```
+
+#### Allow all direct production dependencies
+
+```ini
+allow-scripts = :root > .prod
+```
+
+#### Allow all packages from a scope
+
+```ini
+allow-scripts = [name^="@myorg/"]
+```
+
+### Workspace behavior
+
+In a monorepo, `--allow-scripts` is set once at the root level (in the root
+`.npmrc`). The selector runs against the full dependency tree. Workspace
+packages themselves are always allowed (treated like root). Dependencies of
+workspaces are subject to the selector like any other dependency.
+
+## Risks
+
+### The query language has no trustworthy package identity
+
+The dependency selector language queries properties of arborist `Node`
+objects. Attribute selectors like `[name=...]`, `[version=...]`, and
+`[_id=...]` read from `node.package` — the on-disk package.json extracted
+from the installed tarball. The `#name` id selector is worse: it matches
+`node.name` (the folder name, controllable via aliases) OR
+`node.package.name` (the tarball name). **None of these fields reflect
+where the package was actually fetched from, its source, or the spec that
+resolved to it.** They are all self-reported by the tarball content or
+derived from the dependency key, both of which are attacker-controllable.
+
+Two known attacks exploit this:
+
+**1. Transitive alias attack** (easy to execute):
+A transitive dependency declares `"esbuild": "npm:malware@1.0.0"`. The
+malware package is installed into a nested `node_modules/esbuild`.
+`node.name` (the folder name) is `"esbuild"`. The `#esbuild` id selector
+matches it — malware inherits esbuild's script approval. `:type(registry)`
+does not help because the aliased malware IS a registry package.
+
+`[name="esbuild"]` does NOT match this attack because it checks
+`node.package.name`, which is `"malware"` (the real package name from the
+tarball). **`[name=...]` blocks the alias attack.**
+
+**2. Manifest confusion** (requires publishing a malicious package):
+The npm registry does not validate that the `name` field inside a published
+tarball matches the registry package name ([Manifest Confusion][manifest-confusion],
+disclosed June 2023, unfixed as of 2026). A package published as `malware`
+can include a tarball whose package.json says `name: "esbuild"`. After
+install, `node.package.name = "esbuild"`, so `[name="esbuild"]` matches it.
+**Neither `[name=...]` nor `#name` can distinguish this from the real
+esbuild.**
+
+**What's queryable but not trustworthy:**
+
+| Selector                     | Reads from                                  | Attack                     |
+| ---                          | ---                                         | ---                        |
+| `[name=...]`                 | `node.package.name` (tarball)               | Manifest confusion         |
+| `#name`                      | `node.name` (folder) OR `node.package.name` | Alias + manifest confusion |
+| `[version=...]`, `[_id=...]` | Tarball package.json                        | Manifest confusion         |
+| `[repository=...]`           | Tarball package.json                        | Self-reported              |
+
+**What's trustworthy but not queryable:**
+
+| Property | Notes |
+|---|---|
+| `node.resolved` | Set during resolution/install, not from tarball. Not exposed to attribute selectors. |
+| `node.integrity` | Cryptographic hash of the tarball. Not exposed to attribute selectors. |
+| Edge `name` and `spec` | From the parent's package.json declaration. No selector for edge properties. |
+| `:type(registry\|git\|...)` | Queryable, but only gives the type — not the package name. |
+
+No existing selector combines trustworthy source identity with name
+matching.
+
+### Trustworthy logical identity — required before shipping
+
+Arborist nodes need a queryable field that represents the resolver-facing
+identity of a package — how it was resolved and fetched, not what the
+tarball claims about itself. Without this, `--allow-scripts` cannot
+securely distinguish an approved package from a malicious one that claims
+the same name. **This RFC should not ship until the query language can
+match against a trustworthy identity.**
+
+This field should be a logical id matching how developers declare
+dependencies:
+
+| Dep type | Logical id |
+|---|---|
+| Registry | `esbuild@0.25.0` |
+| Scoped | `@babel/core@7.26.0` |
+| Alias (`my-es → esbuild`) | `esbuild@0.25.0` (real identity, not the alias) |
+| Git | `github:npm/npa#fbbf22...` |
+| File | `file:../local-pkg` |
+
+The building blocks exist — `versionFromTgz` can extract name and version
+from registry tarball URLs by parsing the URL path, `hosted-git-info`
+converts git URLs to shortcut form. But the exact source of truth (the
+actual fetch, the lockfile, the resolver) and where to persist it (on the
+node, in the lockfile, both) are implementation details to be resolved
+before this RFC can be implemented.
+
+### The query language is more expressive than needed
+
+Dependency selectors support structural queries (`:root > .prod`,
+`.workspace:has(.peer)`), pseudo-classes (`:outdated`, `:vuln`), and
+arbitrary attribute matching. For `--allow-scripts`, the practical use
+cases are narrower:
+
+- **Match by name**: `[name="esbuild"]` — the primary use case
+- **Match by name + version**: `[name="esbuild"]:semver(^0.25.0)`
+- **Match by scope**: `[name^="@myorg/"]`
+- **Match direct deps**: `:root > .prod` — useful as a broad starting
+  point, though it auto-approves any new direct dep that adds scripts
+
+Beyond these, it's hard to construct a realistic scenario where structural
+or relational queries add value for script approval. You wouldn't approve
+scripts based on `:outdated` or `:vuln` or tree depth. The expressiveness
+is inherited from reusing the query language, not driven by requirements.
+
+This is fine — the extra expressiveness doesn't hurt, and reusing the
+existing infrastructure avoids inventing a new DSL. But it means the
+selector language is not the hard part of this feature. The hard part is
+trustworthy identity (see above).
+
+### `#name@version` shorthand is not implemented
+
+The `#name@version` shorthand (e.g. `#lodash@^1.2.3`, documented as
+equivalent to `[name="lodash"]:semver(^1.2.3)`) does not work. The CSS
+parser interprets dots as class selectors, and even with escaped dots the
+`idType` handler does a literal string match without semver splitting.
+Use `[name="..."]:semver(...)` instead.
+
+## Rationale and Alternatives
+
+### Why dependency selectors instead of a JSON allowlist?
+
+The previous version of this RFC proposed a JSON allowlist with
+`"approvedInstallScripts": { "esbuild": "allowed" }`. Dependency selectors
+are better because:
+
+Query syntax supports same features as an allowlist as well as structural queries
+and category queries. This pattern can be extended to `--allow-git` and other
+policy options.
+
+### Why not change the default?
+
+Same reasoning as RFC #488's rejection: too disruptive. This is opt-in.
+
+### Alternative: `pnpm`
+
+pnpm 10 blocks lifecycle scripts by default with `onlyBuiltDependencies` /
+`allowBuilds` in `package.json`. Users who can migrate to pnpm already have
+this. This RFC brings equivalent control to npm.
+
+## Implementation
+
+1. **Config**: Add `allow-scripts` (type: String, default: `"all"`) to the
+   npm config schema.
+
+2. **Tree query**: After `Arborist` resolves the tree, if `allow-scripts` is
+   not `"all"`:
+   - If `"none"`: allowed set is empty.
+   - Otherwise: run `tree.querySelectorAll(allowScripts)` to get the allowed
+     set.
+   - Always add root and workspace nodes to the allowed set.
+
+3. **Script gating**: Before executing a lifecycle script for a dependency,
+   check if the node is in the allowed set. If not, skip and record.
+
+4. **Reporting**: After reification, if any unapproved scripts were blocked,
+   print the full list with package specs and blocked lifecycle events, then
+   exit non-zero.
+
+5. **`npm query` integration**: Users can preview what would be allowed:
+   ```sh
+   npm query '[name="esbuild"], [name="better-sqlite3"]'
+   ```
+
+## Prior Art
+
+- [npm/rfcs#488][rfc-488] — "Make npm install scripts opt-in" (2021).
+  369 👍, not merged due to breaking-change concerns.
+- [pnpm `onlyBuiltDependencies` / `allowBuilds`][pnpm-allow] — pnpm 10
+  blocks lifecycle scripts by default with an allowlist in `package.json`.
+- [`@lavamoat/allow-scripts`][lavamoat] — Userland tool that disables
+  scripts via `--ignore-scripts` and selectively re-runs them.
+- [`can-i-ignore-scripts`][ciis] — Helps audit which deps need install
+  scripts.
+- [npm dependency selectors][dep-selectors] — The query syntax this RFC
+  builds on.
+- [Manifest Confusion][manifest-confusion] — Registry does not validate
+  tarball metadata against the packument.
+
+## Unresolved Questions
+
+### Should there be a way to silence scripts without allowing them?
+
+Some packages have non-essential lifecycle scripts — `core-js` prints a
+funding plea, `esbuild` has a postinstall that downloads a platform binary
+but falls back to JS. Users may want to say "I know about these scripts,
+skip them, and don't error about it."
+
+Options:
+- A separate `--ignore-scripts-for=<selector>` config. Scripts matching this
+  selector are skipped silently (no error). Clear intent separation: "allow
+  to run" vs "known, don't run, don't complain."
+- Overload `--allow-scripts` to mean "these packages are accounted for"
+  regardless of whether scripts run. Simpler (one config) but muddies the
+  semantics.
+
+### Should `npm install <pkg>` prompt interactively?
+
+When adding a new dependency that has lifecycle scripts, npm could prompt
+whether to add it to the allow list, similar to how `apt` confirms actions.
+
+### Should there be an `npm approve-scripts` command?
+
+A helper that scans the tree and generates the selector string (or updates
+`.npmrc`) would ease adoption. Deferred to a follow-up RFC.
+
+### Should unapproved scripts warn or error?
+
+This RFC proposes error (non-zero exit). An alternative is a
+`--allow-scripts-policy=warn|error` flag, but that adds complexity. Starting
+with error-only is simpler and more secure.
+
+### Exact versions vs ranges
+
+JamieMagee raised that `[name="esbuild"]:semver(>=0.25.0)` auto-approves
+future compromised versions. Users who want maximum security can pin to
+exact versions. Users who want convenience can use ranges. The RFC provides
+the tools for both.
+
+[rfc-488]: https://github.com/npm/rfcs/pull/488
+[dep-selectors]: https://docs.npmjs.com/cli/v11/using-npm/dependency-selectors
+[arborist-qsa]: https://github.com/npm/cli/blob/latest/workspaces/arborist/lib/query-selector-all.js
+[manifest-confusion]: https://blog.vlt.sh/blog/the-massive-hole-in-the-npm-ecosystem
+[pnpm-allow]: https://pnpm.io/settings#allowbuilds
+[lavamoat]: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@lavamoat/allow-scripts
+[ciis]: https://www.npmjs.com/package/can-i-ignore-scripts